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Palestinian Nationalism:  
From Secularism to Islam 
DAN STOENESCU 
 
 
 
For most of the last half of the 20th century to nowadays, Palestinian nationalism 
puzzled Middle Eastern scholars. Although it was not as old as Arab nationalism, 
Palestinian nationalism fought for independence against Israel and for emancipation 
of Palestinians in the countries they sought refuge in. As opposed to other kinds of 
nationalisms, Palestinian nationalism is intrinsically related to the question of the 
Palestinian refugees. Palestinian nationalism is in great part the product of the refu-
gee camps, intellectuals in the Diaspora and freedom fighters, many of whom were 
refugees or internally displaced people. The timeline for the development of Pales-
tinian nationalism starts in 1948 when Israel declared its independence and contin-
ues to develop in the regional context of the Middle East. In the 1950s and 1960s it is 
influence by Nasser’s Pan-Arabism. The Arab defeat of 1967 gives impetus to this 
movement, bringing it closer to Islam, later on, in the 1980s all the way to this day. 
The objective of this essay is to critically analyze the modern developments of 
Palestinian nationalism. This concept was always an integral part of the political 
discourse in the Middle East from 1948 onwards and even more after 1967. 
Through the years and influenced by the political changes in the region, Palestin-
ian nationalism went through a metamorphosis. Palestinian intellectuals of the 
1950s and 1960s were linking it with Arab nationalism, later on after the great de-
feat of 1967 Palestinian nationalism started to re-emerge as a force of its own fight-
ing for the liberation of Palestine. From the late 1980s to this day Palestinian na-
tionalism is not anymore the traditional nationalism propagated by intellectuals in 
the 1960s but started to incorporate a new Islamic identity that transcends the bor-
ders of Palestine and in the same time fights for its independence. 
The essay is divided in three parts and tries to answer to three essential ques-
tions. The first part will analyze the concept of nationalism and its implications for 
Palestinian nationalism. What are the theoretical approaches when analyzing nation-
alism and how it is this relevant when analyzing Palestinian nationalism? The second 
part will search for the reasons of the emergence of Palestinian nationalism in the Oc-
cupied Territories and in the countries that host large numbers of Palestinian refu-
gees. What are the factors that determined the development of modern Palestinian 
nationalism? The third part will look into the relationship between Palestinian nation-
alism and Islam. Is it possible nowadays to incorporate the ideas of Palestinian na-
tionalism into a broader Islamic view for the future of Palestine? Furthermore, the 
third part will look into the relationship between land, nationalism and Islam and will 
analyze the rise of Hamas and its role in the development of Palestinian nationalism. 
Theoretical Perspectives 
Scholars in the field of nationalism studies argue that the present concept of 
nationalism is a modern combination of Enlightenment and liberal ideas of self 
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ruling, French revolutionary ideas of the community and egalitarianism among 
citizens and German conceptions of a nation formed by history, traditions and 
common culture1. Even the UN Charter considers national self-determination as a 
universally accepted principle and as a base for the modern world order2. 
There are many reasons that encourage nationalism. These reasons include 
dislike of alien cultures, hostility to global media, attractions of secession, the loss 
of local control to foreign investors, hostility to immigration, fears of unemploy-
ment, resentment of supranational institutions such as IMF or World Bank, and 
fears of terrorism and subversion. Furthermore, reasons opposing nationalism are 
shared prosperity, economic integration, migration, travel and tourism, employ-
ment abroad, global threats, world-wide communications, end of belief in eco-
nomic sovereignty3. 
In the Palestinian context the factors that promote Palestinian nationalism are 
the occupation of Palestine by the state of Israel, the mistreatment of Palestinians 
by Israel and some Arab states4, the lack of economic opportunities for Palestinians 
in the West Bank, Gaza and the countries where they sought refuge, the lack of citi-
zenship rights for many Palestinian refugees, dislike of Western and Israeli mili-
tary presence in the Middle East. 
Halliday argues that there are positive and negative features of nationalism. A 
positive feature is the fact that nationalism offers a principle of legitimacy and reali-
zation of democratic principles and at the same time encourages human creativity 
and diversity. Furthermore, another important feature is the sense of belonging that 
nationalism provides. This is based on common things such as language, culture, 
socio-political experiences, economic interests, a collective memory and role in his-
tory. On the negative side, nationalism could create conflicts and violence (milita-
rism, xenophobia, chauvinism, imperialism) and could obstruct cooperation5. 
Furthermore, according to Halliday there are a few national symbols that could 
unite nations. Those symbols are: heroes, flags, colors, language, food and drink, 
clothing, commemorative holidays, anthems and general dislike for some non-na-
tionals6. In the case of Palestinian nationalism there are definitely features that would 
confirm this unity: the common sense of dispossession and historical identity, the 
Palestinian patriotic songs, dancing the Dabki, folk rhetoric and the hate of Israel. 
Anthony Smith argues that there are seven main themes that shape the national-
ist doctrine. According to him humanity is naturally divided into nations and each 
nation has a peculiar character. In his nationalist view the nation, encompassing the 
entire collectivity, is the foundation for power, freedom and self-realization, every 
                                                    
1 Fred HALLIDAY, ”Nationalism”, in John BAYLIS, Steve SMITH (ed.), The Globalisation of 
World Politics, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 445. 
2 Ibidem, p. 447. 
3 Ibidem, p. 442. 
4 Palestinian refugees in many Arabic countries do not have the full rights to work. In 
Lebanon, for years, Palestinians were not allowed to work in dozens of professions. In Egypt 
Palestinians experienced worsening treatment after the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 
1978. More recent examples of punitive treatment of Palestinians include Kuwait’s expulsion of 
tens of thousands of long-term residents in the wake of the 1991 Gulf war and the Libyan 
government’s move in 1995 to show its displeasure with Arafat’s peace negotiations with Israel 
by not renewing the one-year residency visas of some 30 000 Palestinians and beginning 
deportations.  
5 Fred HALLIDAY, ”Nationalism”, cit., pp. 450-451. 
6 Ibidem, p. 451.  
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person needs to belong to a nation. In terms of territoriality, Smith says that na-
tions can only be fulfilled in their own states. The rise of the nation-state brings 
global freedom and harmony and loyalty to the nation state is supreme1. Smith’s 
vision is a representative perrenialist perspective of the concept of nationalism. 
The concept of nationalism could be seen from two perspectives: perennialism 
and modernism. On one hand perennialism, places the nation in a fixed time and 
implies that the task is to discover that fixed point. On the other hand, modernism 
recognizes that definitions change over time and uses parts of the past, selecting 
according to the present needs, and combining them with elements of other cul-
tures2. In analysing modern Palestinian nationalism a modernist approach is more 
suitable since it avoids the inflexibility of history’s normative claims and allows a 
more flexible and historically precise portrayal of nationalism. 
If we want to properly understand Palestinian nationalism we have to take a 
closer look towards Arab nationalism. According to most scholars, Arab nationalism 
has three main dimensions. The first two dimensions are the ways traditionally Ar-
abs saw themselves, as a whole (qaumi) and locally (qutri), depending on the circum-
stances3. For example, when Nasser wanted to influence the Arab countries to agree 
with Egypt, he stressed the qaumi while Sadat stressed the qutri when he signed the 
peace with Israel, in order to downplay his responsibility for the Palestinians4. The 
third obvious dimension is Islam5 because it was revealed to the Arabs and the 
Quran is written in Arabic, the language of God. In the past decade the qutri dimen-
sion and Islam played an important role in shaping Palestinian nationalism. 
The Emergence and Development 
of Palestinian Nationalism 
In order to understand Palestinian nationalism it is important to understand its 
historical link with Arab nationalism. The creation of the state of Israel and the 1948 
war represented a true renaissance for Arab nationalism. This time the Arabs were 
not against the traditional imperialist forces of the West but also against the Zion-
ists6. Furthermore, the new nationalistic wave was led by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel 
Nasser and his nationalist-socialist brand of Arab nationalism driven by anti-Imperi-
alism, socialism, neutralism, republicanism, and Arab unity7. Although many Pales-
tinians supported pan-Arabism hoping that it will bring them back their homeland, 
Gamal Abdel Nasser was a great disappointment for many because he accepted the 
Rogers Plan8. This was an important moment in which Palestinians realized they 
have to look after themselves and not wait for salvation from their Arab brothers. 
                                                    
1 Anthony SMITH, Theories on Nationalism, 2nd edition, Duckworth, London, 1983, p. 21. 
2 Fred HALLIDAY, Nation and Religion in the Middle East, Saqi Books, London, 2000, p. 54.  
3 Ibidem, p. 45. 
4 Ibidem, p. 48. 
5 Ibidem, p. 46.  
6 William L. CLEVELAND, A History of the Modern Middle East, Westview Press, Oxford, 
2000, pp. 260-263. 
7 Don PERETZ, The Middle East Today, Prager Publishers, Westport, Connecticut and London, 
1994, pp. 148-149. 
8 Rosemary SAYIGH, ”Palestinian Identity Among Camp Residents”, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, vol. VI, no. 4, Spring 1977, p. 9. 
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The reasons that determined the emergence of a new Palestinian identity dif-
ferent from the Arab identity among Palestinian refugees are many and they are 
influenced by socio-political and economical factors. Certainly the history of dis-
placement that differed from that of other Arab people, poverty, oppression, un-
certainty of Arab support, discrimination of Palestinians in other Arab countries, 
and the development of new sub-regional identities among Arabs, all these were 
determining factors in the emergence of a new Palestinian identity1. The tension 
between Palestinians and the Arab world was one of sublimation and it forced 
Palestinians to look for a transnational, transpolitical, transhistorical world in or-
der to find normality2. 
Ever since the 1970s Palestinians stopped to consider themselves Arabs only, 
as it used to happen during the Nasserite period, due to three decades of suffering 
and a sense of disappointment with the Arab governments3. In spite of that, his-
torically many factions within the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) held 
more of an Arab nationalist view and they never renounced the pan-Arab ideals al-
though Fatah itself was more inclined to adopt a more Palestinian nationalist ideol-
ogy. Even nowadays the most fervently pan-Arab members of the PLO are justify-
ing their views by stating that the Palestinian struggle must be an important ele-
ment in a pan-Arab movement. This was the case for the Marxist Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which not only considered the ”Palestinian 
revolution” as the first stage towards Arab unity, but also as inseparable from a 
world anti-Imperialist struggle. 
According to Sayigh, beginning with mid-1970s, there is strong evidence that 
shows that the new generation of Palestinian refugees – jeel al-nakba4 (the genera-
tion of the disaster) has a different sense of identity in comparison to their parents. 
Compared to their parents that felt a sense of helplessness (from 1948 to 1968), this 
sense of new identity is due to the fact that the new generation of children born in 
exile are more politically motivated and they feel different from Syrians, Jordani-
ans, Lebanese and Egyptians although hate for Israel unites them5. 
Musa Budeiri6 claims that Palestinian nationalism appeared much later than 
other national movements and developed only after the Ottoman era and the Brit-
ish Mandate. Palestinian nationalism was a result of oppression and displacement 
of Palestinians by the Israeli state and started to develop after 1967 in the refugee 
camps. Therefore Palestinian nationalism is not native to Palestine itself but it is 
rather a product of disillusion and hope of refugees in the camps, amongst intellec-
tuals of the Diaspora and PLO fighters. 
Palestinian nationalism amongst refugees and amongst other Palestinians is a 
clear statement of existential malaise expressed by the culture of fighting oppression. 
                                                    
1 Ibidem, p. 21.  
2 Fawaz TURKI, ”Palestinians Estranged”, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol.5, no. 1/2, Autumn 
1975-Winter 1976, p. 85. 
3 Rosemary SAYIGH, ”Palestinian Identity…cit.”, p. 3. 
4 Al-Nakba comes from the Arabic term meaning the catastrophe. This term defines the sum of 
events prior to Israel’s declaration of independence and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War that erupted 
following the invasion by neighbouring Arab states and resulted in flight or expulsion of over 700 000 
Palestinian refugees and the destruction and abandonment of hundreds of Palestinian villages. 
5 Rosemary SAYIGH, ”Palestinian Identity…cit.”, pp. 8-9. 
6 Salim TAMARI, ”Fading Flags: The Crises of Palestinian Legitimacy”, Middle East Report, 
no.194/195, ”Odds against Peace”, May-August 1995, p. 11.  
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For example ”folk rhetoric, the erotic delight of the glittering arabesques of swear 
words in Palestinian phraseology”1 stopped being means of communications and 
started to express this kind of national malaise. Furthermore, ”dancing the Dabki, 
ululating at weddings, hysterics at public happenings”2 are not anymore expres-
sions of joy and abandon but they convey now rage and constriction. 
In mid-1970s the concept of Palestinian nationalism was not very developed and 
camp refugees had highly conflicting views about what does it mean to be a Palestin-
ian. Research conducted in Palestinian refugee camps observed the fact in order to 
stress unity, there is no social differentiation among Palestinian refugees in terms of 
the way they perceive themselves3. Furthermore in relation with other Arabs, Pales-
tinian refugees perceive themselves as Arabs but they emphasize that they have cer-
tain extra traits such as ”courage; readiness to sacrifice; faithfulness and education”. 
Although these traits are also common to the perceived identities of other Arab peo-
ple, Palestinians see them more from a perspective of intensity of these traits since 
they had to endure occupation and to fight for their freedom for many decades4. 
The particularity of the historical experience of Palestinians created a very 
unique kind of nationalism in which the experiences of oppression of the Palestini-
ans living in the Occupied Territories and those living elsewhere as refugees blend 
and become essential. Because of these experiences many Palestinians have an im-
pulse to deny their identity: 
”A Palestinian from Jaffa, born in Lebanon, who grew up in Kuwait, 
held a Jordanian passport, studied in Cairo and came from Palestine is a per-
son with an acute crisis of self. He wants to flee-outward. He has hitherto in-
ternalized, individualized and stylized his discontent by letting it invade his 
consciousness and catch flame only there. The outside world was not his”5. 
Palestinian nationalism is rooted in the miseries and suffering of Palestinian 
people thus forming a specific sub-culture and counter-politics of the refugee 
camp. For many Palestinian refugees Palestine and being a Palestinian is not al-
ways something to be proud of. Sometimes being a Palestinian means ”work per-
mits, police permits, laissez-passer, neglect, isolation and exclusion”6. 
The Palestinian refugee communities around the Arab world were considered a 
threat to the stability of the political regimes of their host countries and the refugees 
felt abandoned in the same time by Arab leaders. For example, in Lebanon the PLO 
was a key player in the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) taking advantage of the high 
numbers of Palestinian refugee camps in the country and thus loosing the compas-
sion of the Lebanese. By 1970, Palestinians, both Jordanian citizens and refugees, 
were almost as numerous in Jordan as King Hussein’s own Bedouins. Arafat used 
over 20 000 PLO fighters to exercise control over much of the Palestinian population. 
Because of the terrorist activities of militant factions of the PLO, King Hussein was 
forced to expel the organization since it became a threat to the country’s stability. 
Also in Egypt Palestinian refugees are watched by the State Security since they are 
the main suspects in illegal arms trade over the border to Gaza. 
                                                    
1 Fawaz TURKI, ”Palestinians Estranged”, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 5, no.1/2, Autumn 
1975-Winter 1976, p. 88. 
2 Ibidem. 
3 Rosemary SAYIGH, ”Palestinian Identity…cit.”, p. 13. 
4 Ibidem, pp. 18-19. 
5 Fawaz TURKI, ”Palestinians Estranged”, cit., p. 83. 
6 Ibidem, p. 84. 
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In this context, in the end of the 1970s, Palestinian nationalism developed 
mainly among refugees and created a sort of radical nationalist identity like noth-
ing that existed before1. Historically it was shown that continued struggle can lead 
to a sense of national solidarity. The best example of this solidarity is the emer-
gence of Palestinian nationalism, a sense of identity that transcends confessional 
lines and even Arab identity, a solidarity that is intrinsically linked to the land of 
Palestine and to the fight against oppression. 
Palestinian nationalism was not only a product of Israeli repression but also 
one of suppression on the side of host Arab governments. This was the case in Jor-
dan where following the September 1970 fighting, the anti-Palestinian general feel-
ing amongst native Jordanians created a back-clash amongst Palestinians thus 
re-enforcing their sense of identity. Collective killing of Palestinians on the East 
Bank aroused a sense of solitude and dispossession not only amongst them but 
also amongst Palestinians in the West Bank that experienced the same alienation 
under Israeli occupation. 
By the summer of 1971, the Jordanian army crashed the Palestinian groups in 
the country and once again many Palestinians had to find refuge elsewhere. Many 
notable Palestinians went to the West Bank with Israeli approval2. The tragedies of 
1970 and 1971 helped building a sense of unity among Palestinians from refugee 
communities and the ones in West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian nationalism seemed 
to be the ideological answer for fighting oppression either from the Israelis or from 
some Arab states such as Jordan or Lebanon. 
Another repression of Palestinian nationalist movement done by Arab govern-
ments was in Gaza, in the beginning of the 1960s. Although Nasser allowed Pales-
tinians to organize themselves very well in Egypt and actually strongly supported 
them, the same kind of freedom was not allowed to them in the Gaza strip. The 
main reason was a security fear amongst the authorities that the same kind of free-
dom of organization in Gaza would boost Palestinian nationalism and thus chal-
lenge the Egyptian occupation. Moreover, the Egyptian military developed strong 
commercial ties with the Gazan elite thus having now economic reasons for keep-
ing Palestinian nationalism in check3. 
Like many other forms of nationalism, Palestinian nationalism perpetuated it-
self not only through political ways but also through education and culture. For 
example, a recent study on Palestinian textbooks reveals a new development of 
Palestinian nationalism. The oppression and propaganda of Israel created a 
counter-reaction thus giving an impetus to Palestinian nationalist forces. In Pales-
tinian textbooks the geographic extent of the Palestinian nation, includes all the 
territory west of the Jordan River, while in many illustrations the slogan ”Jerusa-
lem Is Ours”4 appears. Furthermore the maps indicate only a Palestinian state ig-
noring the existence of Israel and thus, according to many Israeli scholars, promot-
ing a destructive kind of nationalism among Palestinian youth. 
                                                    
1 E.G.H. JOFFE, ”Arab Nationalism and Palestine”, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 20, no. 2, 
June 1983, p. 167. 
2 Issa AL-SHUAIBI, ”The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part II”, Journal 
of Palestine Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, Winter 1980, pp. 69-70. 
3 Laurie BRAND, ”Nasir’s Egypt and the Reemergence of the Palestinian National Movement’, 
Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, Winter 1988, p. 43. 
4 National Education, Textbook for the Sixth Grade, Palestinian Ministry of Education, 
Ramallah, 2000-2001, p. 24. 
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Furthermore, Palestinian literature is a powerful venue for nationalism to be 
propagated to the masses. In Palestinian poetry, Palestine is portrayed as a lover or 
as a mother. For poets Palestine is far and wide, known and yet to be known, is al-
ways her, the breast to suckle, the lap to sit on, the power to appeal to in a moment 
of crisis, a virgin garden1. Palestinian nationalism will always have sorrow at-
tached to it because even if someday Palestinians will have an independent home-
land it will be only a fragment of what Palestine used to be. ”Living in the ghourba, 
having no homeland became for the Palestinians the homeland.”2 
From Secular Nationalism  
to Islamic Nationalism 
Since the society in many Arab countries is culturally very traditional com-
pared to the West, the dimension of Islam was always significant for the people 
but not that much for the secular governments. The 1967 defeat and the disap-
pointment of Nasserist policies created a new momentum for Islam, thus convert-
ing this ignored third part of Arabism3 in the dominant one. The influence of this 
movement can be also observed in the metamorphosis of Palestinian nationalism 
in the past two decades. 
Joffe argues that in the case of Palestinians there are three conflicting identi-
ties: Muslim, Arabic and secular4. Moreover, after 1967 when Palestinian national-
ism developed more, the question of identity began to be divisive. Neither Arab-
ism nor secular ethnic nationalism, that led to Camp David as it was the case of 
Egypt, proved to be solutions for the identity crises and problems of Palestinian 
refugees. Therefore, from the perspective of many Palestinian leaders, the return to 
”pure Islamic social organization”5 might solve the question of identity for Pales-
tinians in the occupied territories and in the refugee camps, thus integrating them 
into the bigger Muslim World and giving them more hope. 
From a historical perspective, Arabs, including Palestinians, always tried to 
have Islam as a fundamental part of their Arab identity for several reasons. On one 
hand, Peretz argues that Islam is seen as a way to resist the ”Christian” West from 
the Crusades to the present day6, thus legitimizing religion as a factor that brings 
freedom in the Arab world. Furthermore, for Muslims, Islam is more important 
than any other concepts including nationalism. In order to understand why many 
Muslims can not accept the idea of a nation, it is necessary to look into the concept 
of the all-inclusive umma (community of believers), a concept that does not have 
national borders and operates under the concept of dar-ul-islam (the house of Is-
lam) which differentiates between the believers and the infidels7. 
                                                    
1 Fawaz TURKI, ”Palestinians Estranged”, cit., p. 94. 
2 Ibidem, p. 95. 
3 Pan-Arabism became even more popular in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war since 
Saddam Hussein managed to gather most of the Arab countries against the historical Persian 
enemy. Although Iraq did not manage to take over the Arabic province of Khuzestan, the Arab 
public sympathized with the Iraqis and their Pan-Arabic ideals.  
4 E.G.H. JOFFE, ”Arab Nationalism…cit.”, p. 157. 
5 Ibidem, p. 157. 
6 Don PERETZ, The Middle East Today, cit., p. 155.  
7 Sami ZUBAIDA, Islam, The People And The State, I.B. Taurus & Co. Ltd, London and New 
York, 1993, p. 130.  
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Islamic thinking developed in mid-nineteenth century as a fight against Euro-
pean colonialism. Many Islamic thinkers blamed the corruption of Islam on the 
Westernization of Middle Eastern societies and on colonialism1. Islamic scholars of 
that time believed that: 
”In the political domain, the invention of modernity lies in the emer-
gence of an autonomous political space, separate from both the religious and 
private spheres and embodied in the modern, law-based based state”2. 
The abovementioned ”law-based state”, nonetheless was a secular political sys-
tem in which religious law did not play any role. This system was the embodiment 
of the West and its influence in the Muslim world. Many Islamic scholars of the 19th 
and early 20th century considered this style of secular government as immoral and 
corrupt, since it separated religion and religious law from the government. 
This kind of ideas influenced Hassan Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Al-Banna was born in 1906 in Al Mahmudiyya, Egypt, and was 
raised in a traditionally religious environment. Nevertheless through his schooling 
he became familiar with modern western ideas3. The Muslim Brotherhood and Is-
lamic politics have a long historical relation to Palestine. Since the 1936 Great Pal-
estinian Revolt, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt started paying attention to the 
problem of the ”Zionist invasion” in Palestine4. 
At a conference in 1936, the Muslim Brotherhood founded the General Central 
Committee to Aid Palestine. Headed by Al-Banna, this committee was also meant as 
protest against the British lenience towards the Zionists5 and to educate the masses 
about Palestine6. Moreover, members of the Muslim Brotherhood formed militias in 
Palestine, in order to attack Jewish settlements and supplying arms to local Palestin-
ian fighters7. This was the beginning of the Egyptian aid towards Palestine in the 
years following the Great Palestinian Revolt, even though the Muslim Brotherhood 
would not officially be founded in Palestine until 19468. The Muslim Brother’s 
”efforts and their commitment to the Palestinian cause were driven by their 
doctrinaire perspective and faith in the concept of one Islamic nation and the 
brotherhood of all Muslims and the imperative to engage in jihad for the 
cause of God”9. 
                                                    
1 J.M.S BALJON, Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation (1880-1960), E.J. Brill, Leiden, Netherlands, 
1961, p. 3. 
2 Olivier ROY, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. C. Volk, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1994, p. 8. 
3 John L. ESPOSITO, Voices of Resurgent Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983, 
pp. 9-10. 
4 Khaled HROUB, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, The Institute for Palestine Studies, 
Washington D.C., 2000, p. 12. 
5 Zionism also went through a similar process (secular and territorial) between the 1930s and 
the 1950s. Later on after the 1967 and 1973 Wars, the religious nature of Zionism became even 
more evident. 
6 Ziad ABU-AMR, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and 
Islamic Jihad, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1994, p. 3. 
7 Khaled HROUB, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, The Institute for Palestine Studies, 
Washington D.C., 2000, p. 13. 
8 Hisham AHMAD, Hamas: From Religious Salvation to Political Transformation, PASSIA, 
Jerusalem, 1994, p. 14. 
9 Khaled HROUB, Hamas: Political Thought...cit., p. 13. 
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The activities of the Muslim Brotherhood were viewed favourably in Palestine, 
and with the support of Hajj Amin Al-Huseini, the Brotherhood in Palestine was 
able to grow efficiently. Moreover, it is important to note that the Muslim Brother-
hood’s approach towards the Palestinian issue was the motivating force that al-
lowed the growth of the organization in other Middle Eastern countries such as 
Jordan and Syria1. 
Even though the Muslim Brotherhood was one of the most combative groups 
in the 1948 war, the organization did not join the armed resistance movement. 
Hamas scholar Khaled Hroub states: 
”The mainstream Brotherhood chose the alternative of consolidating the 
power of its existing organization in the expectation that, when it succeeded 
in its mission, it would liberate Palestine with the support of the Islamic 
world. The Brotherhood felt it could appeal to the fact that Muslims every-
where had a sacred duty to save Jerusalem, which was the first qibla in Islam, 
and to liberate the land of al-isra’ wal mi-raj”2. 
Thirty years later, when Hamas broke from the Muslim Brotherhood, its lan-
guage and the ideological weight placed on the actual land of Palestine would be 
particularly evocative of the Muslim Brotherhood in the years leading up to the 1967 
Arab-Israel war. By the first Intifada of 1987, the aggravating situation in Palestinian 
Territories reached its zenith, especially in Gaza after the Israeli army stormed the Is-
lamic University and opened fire, wounding many of defenceless students3. 
The turn of Palestinians to political Islam was influenced by pre-existing cul-
tural orientations4 and it is closer to popular expectations, thus ensuring national 
cohesion in a faster and easier way. In the Middle East, resurgence of political Is-
lam started with the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran5. Since the Iranian revolution, 
Islamic discourse has become a very powerful ideology of protest and Islamist 
movements constitute the main opposition forces of opposition to the state in most 
Middle Eastern countries. In the Palestinian case the blending of nationalism with 
Islamic ideology is a natural process and represents no surprise since previously 
all other venues of fight for liberation had been used. 
Although about 90% of Palestinians are Sunni Muslims, Islamic political doc-
trines, never fully entered the Palestinian movement until the 1980s. From an Is-
lamic perspective, the struggle for Palestine was viewed exclusively from a reli-
gious standpoint, as a struggle to retrieve Muslim lands and the holy places of Al 
Quds (Jerusalem). Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, Muslim sympathy with the Pal-
estinian struggle, led to many Islamic movements accepting nationalism as a justi-
fiable ideology. In the case of Hamas – the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim 
Brotherhood – Palestinian nationalism has almost completely blended with the 
pan-Islamic ideology thus planting the seeds for a future Hamas control in the Pal-
estinian territories in 2006. 
                                                    
1 Ibidem. 
2 Ibidem, p. 27. 
3 Ibidem, p. 39. 
4 E.G.H. JOFFE, ”Arab Nationalism…cit.”, p. 169. 
5 Moreover Iran became a country exporting the Islamic Revolution believing that only this 
way Muslims and non-Muslims can liberate themselves from the oppression of tyrants who serve 
the interests of international imperialism. This has been especially true with respect to Iran’s 
policy toward Lebanon, the strategic alliance with Syria and, to a lesser degree, its policy in the 
Persian Gulf. 
322 DAN STOENESCU 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VII • no. 2 • 2007 
According to Joffe ”the Arab failure over Palestine has forced Arab popula-
tions back to indigenous sources of inspiration”1. Although Palestinian nationalism 
and nationalism in general were antithetical to Islam, the persistence of Israeli 
presence in the Palestinian Territories and the Western involvement in the Middle 
East triggered an approach between Islam and Palestinian nationalism. The idea of 
complementarity between Islam and Arab nationalism was stated by politicians 
such as colonel Qadafi of Libya since 1982 and it was re-enforced by the rise of 
radical Islamic movements around the Middle East in countries such as Lebanon, 
Saudi Arabia or Egypt. 
In order to increase its legitimacy and mobilize the Palestinians the PLO lead-
ership also started to use Islamic symbols and rhetoric in the 1990s. Yasser Arafat 
was not only the first president of the Palestinian Authority or the leader of the 
PLO; he was also the father of Palestinian nationalism. Although he was a secular 
leader having a leftist background and ideology, Arafat did not hesitate to link his 
nationalist ideology to Islam in order to advance his political agenda. 
Although Arafat established the Fatah movement for Palestinian Liberation in 
1959, the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967 was the starting point for in-
corporating Muslim thought into his nationalist ideology2. This way Arafat was 
trying to link the holy Muslim places of Jerusalem to the Muslim psyche and thus 
trying to get involved in the Palestinian struggle all Arab and Muslim countries 
who initially saw the Palestinian question as an Arab-Israeli affair. After Arafat’s 
death, the fact that Palestinians wanted to bury him in Jerusalem, near the Noble 
Sanctuary further shows the strong link national Palestinian symbols have with Is-
lam3. Another example of blending nationalism with Islamic ideology is the fact 
that in the May 1992 elections for the Chamber of Commerce in Nablus, the na-
tional list ran under the title ”The National-Islamic Current”. Furthermore, Fatah 
activists participated in rising of open Korans in their student council electoral 
campaign at Al-Najah University in Nablus4. 
As expressed by Fatah, Palestinian nationalism is Islamic in content and lacks 
a proper social agenda. Therefore it was easy for many Palestinians to switch their 
allegiance in the late 1980s from Palestinian secular factions to organizations such 
as Hamas or Islamic Jihad, maintaining in the same time their nationalist ideology 
and even considering it as complementary to Islam5. Moreover, the PLO and Fatah 
lost massive popular support among the Palestinian people after they left into exile 
in Tunis and after they became involved in the peace negotiations. For this reason 
the increasing popularity of Hamas was no surprise. 
Although Arafat tried to incorporate Islam into the Palestinian national move-
ment he did not entirely succeed simply because Islam was not the base for his po-
litical ideology. Khan argues that ”in order to create a good-cop bad-cop scenario 
to deal with Israel” Arafat allowed Hamas to grow and thus endangering the unity 
of Palestinian and creating a rift which may endanger the emergence of an in-
dependent Palestinian state6. 
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In 1987, on December 6th, an Israeli settler was stabbed to death by a member 
of Islamic Jihad; in the frenzy that followed, on 8 December an Israeli truck ran 
over 13 Palestinian workers returning home from work, killing four and wounding 
nine. In the same day, in Jabaliya, the hometown of three of the workers people 
started to protest. The protests spread across the Palestinian Territories and there-
fore 8 December is considered the start of the first Palestinian uprising, or Intifada1. 
On 9 December, in Gaza, the members of the Political Bureau of the Muslim Broth-
erhood met to discuss earlier events. 
Those present at this meeting – Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz al-Rantisi, 
Salah Shehadeh, Muhammad Sham’ah, ‘Isa al-Nashshar, ‘Abdel Fattah Dukhan, 
and Ibrahim al-Yazuri – decided that this was the best time to begin a confronta-
tion with Israel. Furthermore, the first communiqué from what would become 
known as Hamas was issued2. Although Hamas was first considered the armed 
wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the growth of the organization, transformed 
Hamas in an entirely separate body, even though its ideology clearly comes from 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s beliefs. 
Islamic Resistance Movement (known better by its Arabic acronym – Hamas), 
played a vital role in the first Intifada (which erupted in December 1987), as well as 
in the second Intifada (which erupted in September 2000). Through effectively com-
bining nationalist slogans with religious symbols, Hamas managed to mobilize 
huge masses of people and gained their trust. The founding of Hamas in 1987 re-
flected the increasing power and influence of Islamism in Gaza and the West Bank. 
In spite of the fact that Hamas draws its support mainly from marginalized groups, 
its support base also includes representation from almost all social classes – intel-
lectuals and illiterate people; businessmen and fellaheen (farmers); laborers and 
white-collar employees; the young and the old; women and men alike3. 
In the new political context of 1987 it was absolutely necessary for Hamas to vali-
date{ the struggle with the Israelis as a Muslim obligation in direct connection with 
the teachings of Islam. Such a validation came from the notion that Palestine was and 
should be an Islamic state, and the occupation of Muslim Palestine was the main rea-
son to fight Israel. Hamas’s argument is based on the idea that the land of Palestine is 
Muslim and should remain as such since it stated so according to Islamic law. 
From its establishment Hamas had to deal with the opposing ideas of advocat-
ing for the establishment of a supra-national Islamic state based on the laws of the 
sharia’a4 and in the same time fighting for the establishment of an independent Pal-
estinian state. Aburaiya argues that Hamas managed to establish itself as the main 
political actor in the Palestinian Territories and draw support from Palestinian 
refugees due to three main factors: 
”First, the failure of the PLO to achieve what in the eyes of the majority of 
the Palestinians consider as a minimum for political settlements with Israel. 
Second, Hamas’ effective co-optation and Islamization of secular Palestinian 
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nationalism. Third, Hamas’ ability to interpret Islam in a way that enables it 
to maintain a balance between pure ideological discourse and vision and re-
alistic and pragmatic political behavior”1. 
Moreover, Hamas was the first organization that introduced Islamic national-
ism into its political discourse. 
After the Oslo accords of September 1993, Palestinian nationalism could also 
be analyzed through its manifestations on the Palestinian street. Symbols always 
comprise a very important part of any nationalistic movement and in terms of Pal-
estinian nationalism even the national symbols started to be influenced by Islam. 
Such an example is the Palestinian flag. Forbidden during the Israeli occupation 
the Palestinian flag proudly displayed in Oslo and immediately after the establish-
ment of the Palestinian Authority it became a symbol of unity and mass mobili-
zation. The flag also portrayed the ever-changing political situation of Palestinian 
nationalism. For example, in mid 1990s, Hamas2 invented its own Palestinian flag 
inserting the shahadeh (Muslim profession of faith) in the wide center strip to differ-
entiate it from the flag of Palestinian nationalism. The Hamas flags are very popular 
with the masses nowadays. 
Another shift of nationalist symbols towards Islamic symbols is the prepon-
derance of the Al Aqsa mosque in the Palestinian nationalist discourse. The dome 
of the Al Aqsa Mosque is the logo of the Palestinian television channel while small 
scale copies of the mosque are displayed at anti-Israeli demonstrations. After 2000, 
when the second Intifada actually started at the Al Aqsa mosque, the mosque be-
came a nationalist symbol of resistance having in the same time powerful religious 
significance not only for the Palestinians but also for all Muslims since it is one of 
the holiest places of Islam. Moreover the mosque is also present as a symbol for the 
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a Fatah affiliated group that draws its ideology from 
Arab nationalism3. 
Furthermore a Hamas leaflet evokes the unforgivable loss of the ”blessed 
al-Aqsa mosque” to Islam4. For Palestinian nationalism the Islamic symbols of Je-
rusalem became essential. On the centrality of Jerusalem to the Palestinians and the 
need of it being controlled by Muslims, Hamas writes: 
”In the event of al-Isra’ wal-Mi’raj, God placed the crown of the proph-
ets’ seal as the master of the men of the soil of Palestine. In no other capital 
and in no other city on earth but Jerusalem did an event like al-Isra’ occur, so 
that it might become the sister of Mecca in history and so that the Muslims 
might know that the abandonment of Jerusalem is tantamount to the aban-
donment of Mecca and al Madina”5. 
This kind of stance on Jerusalem unmistakably reflects Hamas’ practical endeav-
our to appeal to Muslims around the world. This appeal is a practical endeavour 
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simply because unlike Palestine, which is not referred to in the Quran or hadith lit-
erature, the holy city of Jerusalem is recognized as the location of the ”furthest 
mosque”, which Muhammad travelled to on his night journey1 and it was the place 
of the first qibla (direction of prayer). Moreover, Hamas regards Palestine as the 
most sacred place after Mecca and al-Medina, and giving up even a piece of it is 
”to forgo the faith of the nation and of Islam”, and betrays prophet Muhammad 
and all the martyrs of Islam2. 
In the 2006 elections Hamas appeared in front of the electorate of the Palestin-
ian Territories with a political program based on a number of principles arising 
from Islam since according to Hamas this is as consensus point among all Pales-
tinians as well as among the Arabs and Muslims in general. These principles recog-
nize Islam as a base for political, economical, social and legal development. More-
over they recognize historical Palestine as a part of the Arab and Islamic land and 
the Palestinian people as one unit, part and parcel of the Arab and Islamic nation. 
Hamas’ political program stresses the support for the resistance of Palestinians 
against occupation and the future establishment of a complete sovereign Palestin-
ian state having Jerusalem is its capital3. 
The text of Hamas’ 2006 political program also known as the list for Change 
and Reform encompasses all areas of interests for the Palestinian people: guiding 
principles, domestic policy, foreign relations, administrative reform and combating 
corruption, legislative policy and judicial reform, public freedom and citizen 
rights, educational and pedagogical policy, preaching and guidance, social policy, 
cultural and media policy, woman, child and family issues, youth issues, housing 
policy, health and environment policy, agricultural policy, economic, financial and 
monetary policy, labour and workers issues, transportation and crossings4. 
The Change and Reform list of Hamas became very appealing to the Palestinians 
not only because of the need of a viable alternative to Fatah but also because during 
the electoral campaign, in the beginning of 2006, verses from the Quran were cited fre-
quently in order to give a truly theological base to the political program. For example 
Hamas’ 2006 political program refers to Islam and God so many times: 
”Allah Says in the holy Quran and this (i.e. Allah’s commandments 
mentioned in the above 2 verses 151 & 152) is My straight path, so follow it, 
and follow not (other) paths, for they will separate you away from this path. 
This He has ordaining for you that you may become Almuttaqin (pious) – Al 
Anaam Surah 153”5. 
In the introduction to the political program Hamas categorically states: 
”Due to our conviction that we are defending one of the greatest bays of 
Islam; due to our responsibility towards our struggling people and their holy 
and just cause; due to our duty to contribute in reforming the Palestinian real-
ity, to alleviate the suffering of our brave people, consolidate their resistance 
and protect them against corruption; and due to our hope to consolidate our 
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national unity and to reinforce the domestic Palestinian front: we decided to 
participate in the Palestinian legislative elections 2006”1. 
The position of Hamas relating to the question of land in Palestine is one of 
the most important examples of how a national issue is transformed by an Islamic 
organization and becomes an issue with theological nuances going far beyond the 
nationalistic discourse. In its political program Hamas’ claim to the land is made 
based on Islamic legal principles. The Hamas view concerning the land is most evi-
dently articulated in its initial communiqués and charters2. 
When Hamas was founded in 1987, its vision for Palestine was a land ”from 
the river (Jordan) to the (Mediterranean) sea”. Moreover, the organization consid-
ered the entire Palestinian territory as a waqf land, meaning a property that has 
been endowed for charitable purposes for an indefinite period of time. The notion 
of waqf, and the group that uses the land is one of the key methods of engaging the 
Palestinians on the Hamas side. 
On 14 December 1988, in the first communiqué of Hamas, the organization 
calls the ”Muslim masses” to fight in order to regain their land and rights in the 
”homeland” and to restore the pride of the Palestinian nation3. Since Hamas was a 
new group on the Palestinian political scene it was absolutely necessary for it to 
gain legitimacy among the people that were already mobilized in the first Intifada. 
Hamas had to establish itself among the nationalistic, secular groups fighting the 
Israeli occupation. The novelty was that the new popular group held Islamic be-
liefs and became even more involved in the fighting, even more than older groups 
such as the Islamic Jihad. 
Since the beginning of 1988, Hamas’s political program began to visibly reveal 
its Islamic identity. In its first communiqué that year, the organization already con-
siders Palestinians as being murabitun, Muslims whose duty is to defend the borders 
during the early period of Muslim conquests4. In this leaflet, released by Hamas it is 
written: ”O murabitun on the soil of immaculate and beloved Palestine”. Evoking the 
past and linking it to the present is a way of obliging the Muslims of Palestine, to join 
in the resistance and defend their ancestral Muslim land of Palestine5. 
The historical approach is not new to Hamas. In most of the organization’s 
rhetoric there are many links to the Crusades and the Western invaders, links that 
are brought all the way to the present Western and Israeli involvement in Pales-
tine. Furthermore in this communiqué, Hamas denounces the Camp David Ac-
cords between Israel and Egypt and sees them as Egypt’s ”falling asleep” to the 
Palestinian cause6. 
The historical approach continues also in the second leaflet in which Hamas 
evokes the loss of land in both 1948 and 1967. Again the murabitun are mentioned 
but this time in a much sturdy way than in the previous flyer: 
”Our people the murabit on its soil in which they have mingled their 
blood with the blood of their ancestors, fighters of the holy war among the 
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immaculate Companions of the Prophet (sahaba), and their righteous and 
merciful descendents”1. 
Strengthening foreign relations with Arab and Muslim countries is of primor-
dial and strategic importance for Hamas. This way the Palestinian nation is better 
integrated into the Muslim Ummah. Furthermore, Hamas promotes in its foreign 
policy an ”activation of the role played by Arab and Islamic masses to support the 
resistance of people against occupation, and the refusal of normalization with the 
enemy”2. Even in the third section of the 2006 political program, Hamas makes ref-
erences to the Ummah stressing the importance of fighting sectarian, local and 
moral calls that seek to divide the Muslim Ummah. Only after making reference to 
the importance of the relations with other Arab and Muslim countries and the im-
portance of the Ummah, Hamas’ foreign policy focuses on the international com-
munity and the fight for the Palestinian cause, the sovereignty of a Palestinian 
state, the illegitimacy of the occupation and its consequences3. 
In the light of secular nationalism, for many years, Palestinians considered them-
selves as being either Muslims or Christians, seeing no contradiction between their re-
ligious and ethnic identity. Historically, Palestinian nationalism is the main political 
ideology for Palestinian Christians who disregard issues of religious identity or faith 
in their political struggle. Most Palestinian Christians cultivate a secularist outlook in 
order to strengthen the bonds of unity with their fellow Palestinian Muslim compatri-
ots. Most Palestinian intellectuals would agree that sectarian hatreds and interconfes-
sional bloodletting is absent among Palestinians and the Palestinians are united 
against the Zionist occupier. In the 2006 elections some Christians even voted for 
Hamas in order to protest the rampant corruption of the Fatah-led government. 
In spite of the fact that many might consider Hamas an Islamic organization 
that focuses solely on Muslims, Hamas’ political program mentions also the Chris-
tians who are considered as ”people of the book” (people mentioned in the Quran). 
The Christians of Palestine are considered part of the Palestinian nation. The fight 
against Israeli occupation is a common purpose for both Christian and Muslim Pal-
estinians. In the context of preserving the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem, 
Hamas calls for ”resisting enemy attempts towards Jerusalem Judaization and pro-
tecting Palestinian Islamic and Christian holy places from Zionist desecration”4. 
Furthermore, Hamas calls for ”keeping both Muslim and Christian Palestinian en-
tailments away from aggression and cheat as well as developing such entailments 
in a way that suits their moral and materialistic values”5. 
Taking into consideration the more recent blending of militant Islam and Pal-
estinian nationalism in the mainstream political discourse, the status of Palestinian 
Christians is declining. In recent years, the resurgence of militant Islamism among 
the Palestinians revealed that Christians are actually increasingly sidelined and 
rendered largely irrelevant in the general struggle for the liberation of Palestine6. 
The fact is that if the Islamists ever fulfilled their dream of defeating the Israelis the 
                                                    
1 ”Leaflet No. 2”, Shaul MISHAL, Reuben AHARONI, Speaking Stones...cit., p. 204. 
2 HAMAS, ”The Text of Hamas Legislative Elections Program”, cit., p. 4. 
3 Ibidem. 
4 Ibidem, p. 3. 
5 Ibidem, p. 4. 
6 Charles M. SENNOTT, The Body and the Blood: The Holy Land’s Christians at the Turn of a New 
Millennium, Public Affairs, New York, 2001, pp. 409-450.  
328 DAN STOENESCU 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VII • no. 2 • 2007 
ideology of Palestinian nationalism will not protect the Christians from the oppres-
sion of the radical Islamist groups that are becoming even more powerful day by 
day1. Furthermore, in 2006, the new Hamas cabinet obviously does not have any 
important Christian members as Fatah used to have. 
Islam forms the basis for the national development of Palestine in the view of 
Hamas. All areas of society have to abide to Islam according to the party’s ideology 
and political program. In terms of civil law, for example, Hamas stresses the impor-
tance of the Shar`ia courts (Islamic courts). As the bases of law in the Palestinian Terri-
tories Hamas advocates the need to pass laws originating from Islamic law and juris-
prudence in order to encourage the ”development of Palestinian Muslim society”. 
Furthermore, Hamas calls for passing legislation related to Palestinian (Shar`ia) 
religious courts at different levels, in order for these laws to be applied in the same 
ways in the courts of Jerusalem, West Bank and Gaza. For example entailment law, 
heritage law and laws regarding non Muslim factions are considered matters that 
need to be dealt with in religious courts. Moreover, Hamas even supports a greater 
representation of religious courts in the Palestinian constitutional court2. 
In their policies regarding women, Hamas recognizes that the Palestinian 
woman is not only a partner in building and development but also in Jihad and re-
sistance. Furthermore, Islamic education is considered by Hamas as essential for 
women in order for them to have an ”independent character based on virtuous-
ness, modesty and moral obligation”3. 
In terms of educational and pedagogical policy Hamas considers that it is the 
duty of the young generation to determine the future of the Palestinian nation, 
namely bringing freedom and independence. Therefore education is of outmost 
importance for the Islamic organization. Although Hamas claims that ”education 
should also go along with up-to-date systems”, Islam still remains the base of edu-
cation. Hamas considers that: 
”Applying Principles on which the philosophy of pedagogy and educa-
tion is based, first of which, is that Islam is a comprehensive system that in-
cludes man’s welfare and that it preserves mans’ rights in parallelism with 
community’s”4. 
In the sixteenth section of Hamas’ political program dedicated to economic, fi-
nancial and monetary policy, again God is invoked: 
”Allah (SWT) Says: ’Those who, when they spend, are not extravagant and 
not niggardly, but hold a just (balance) between those (extremes)’ and: ’Allah 
will deprive usury of all blessing, but will give increase for deeds of charity’”5. 
In the epilogue of the political program, Hamas appeals directly to the voter in 
order to convince the electorate that the organization is simply carrying God’s will: 
”Dear voter, 
When you are in front of the polls remember your responsibility be-
tween god hands […] You are entrusted with your testimony to choose your 
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representative in the legislative council. When this representative speaks and 
has the final word of the future, nation and religion; he expresses yourself, so 
choose the best to please your generous god and your great prophet (Peace 
Be Upon Him) […] Yes, choose the best to be happy and to please your peo-
ple God’s will. ’Islam is the solution’ is our way to change and reform. Our 
program is our way to support the society which has been destroyed by the 
occupation and protect its resistance. Our program is our way to support the 
Islamic and national unity towards thorough national liberty. Our program is 
the people’s and whole nation’s program”1. 
The Hamas’ political program ends in a way that promises define rewards for 
the Hamas voters: 
”And say: Work (righteousness): Soon will Allah observe your work, 
and His Messenger, and the Believers: Soon will ye be brought back to the 
knower of what is hidden and what is open: then will He show you the truth 
of all that ye did”2. 
The continuing fighting in the Palestinian Territories and the low standards of 
living brought the Palestinians closer to Hamas and gave them the power in 2006. 
For the first time in the history of the Palestinian Territories the fight for independ-
ence and national self-determination was led by an Islamic party. Although, God 
and nationalism came together under Hamas the prospects for liberating Palestine 
through Islam seem bleak. 
Conclusion 
In the last decade, Middle Eastern scholars and political analysts have noticed 
the emergence of a new kind of Palestinian nationalism – a spiritual and political 
link that is evolving independently of state institutions and is following an Islamic 
path. In 2006 this new Palestinian Islamic nationalism, permeated into the struc-
tures of the Palestinian Authority through the Hamas led government. Ironically 
this new Palestinian Islamic Nationalism supports nationalism and Islam, two fea-
tures that historically seemed antithetical. The emergence of Palestinian Islamic na-
tionalism is not surprising since many Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza but 
also the refugees, realize that PLO and its brand of secular nationalism did not 
bring economic prosperity and independence for Palestine. 
In its political discourse Hamas manages to use Palestinians’ claim to the land of 
historic Palestine and makes it one of the most important aspects of its ideology. The 
strength of Hamas does not come from their claim to the land of Palestine according 
to the sharia’a, but from their aim to regain all of the land lost in 1948. This empowers 
them and transforms its ideals truly into national ideals of the Palestinian people. 
Since the Palestinians place a higher value on their ancestral land than any other na-
tion, allows for Hamas to use weak, fundamentalist arguments. Land, physically and 
emblematically, defines national Palestinian identity and this exact fact gives Hamas 
political strength. For this rationale, the link between the land and Palestinian na-
tional identity is crucial in understanding the shift towards Islam. 
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This essay concludes that secular Palestinian nationalism was just a stage in 
the development of Palestinian national identity and it can not succeed in the con-
temporary political situation of the region. The political circumstances transformed 
the Palestinian nationalism into a Palestinian Islamic nationalism that sees the an-
swers in the Quran rather than in the traditional Nasserist ideology. Therefore, 
nowadays Palestinian nationalism transformed itself and its adepts returned to the 
traditional Islamic concepts in order to fight for the independence of Palestine. 
